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The complexity and heterogeneity of causes  influencing ecology’s  domain challenge its 
capacity to generate a general theory without exceptions, raising the question of whether 
ecology is  capable, even in principle, of achieving the sort of theoretical success  enjoyed by 
physics. Weber has argued that competition theory built around the Competitive Exclusion 
Principle (especially Tilman’s  resource-competition model) offers  an example of ecology 
identifying a law-like causal regularity. However, I suggest that as Weber presents  it, the CEP 
is  not yet a causal regularity. Instead, I argue that the scientific understanding in Tilman’s 
theory takes a different form. The theory explains  through a structure I call “channeling 
explanation” which does  not depend on deduction from general laws, but rather builds  on 
constraints  and trade-offs represented in state-space. Recognizing this structure supports  the 
more general point that ecology and other so-called special sciences  can reveal novel 
theoretical approaches  to philosophy of science when approached with openness to their 
uniqueness. 
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1. Introduction
Philosophy of science cut its  teeth this last century describing ideal science by drawing on the estimable 
model of established parts  of physics. Following physicists’ successes  at articulating necessary, universal laws, 
philosophers  of science held up laws  of science as  the pith of ideal scientific theories. They scrutinized what 
kinds of generalizations  can count as  laws. Yet, also during the twentieth century, scientific research and 
scientific disciplines  proliferated, and very little of the resulting knowledge has  yielded necessary, universal 
laws. How should we assess  whether any of these disciplines  is  theoretically successful? Three options  present 
themselves: (1) we can treat their knowledge as  embryonic and maturing into the profile of physics, (2) we 
can relax and expand definitions  of laws  so their knowledge becomes  lawful under the new definitions, or (3) 
we can explore whether their theory might be epistemically robust despite having a different, lawless 
structure.
This essay takes  the third approach to part of ecology, less  from an a priori conviction that ecology 
cannot have laws than from curiosity about whether ecology looks  more accomplished when measured 
against a standard other than the Newtonian Ideal—the ideal that successful science is  built around 
necessary, universal laws  (Lewontin  2003). It pursues  whether ecology offers  up any such alternative 
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standards if approached with an eye towards  theoretical structures  other than laws. Specifically, it scrutinizes 
a body of ecological theory in which philosopher Marcel Weber (1999) has  argued that we can find law-like 
generalizations, and argues  that its  explanatory resources become clearer if it is  understood differently. The 
immediate upshot is  recognizing a form of explanation which is  not nomothetic (i.e., law-based). This  is  not 
to say that the competition theory in question is  uniquely suggestive of an alternative analysis. To the 
contrary, Weber engages  this body of theory because it is  exceptionally suggestive of a law or laws. My 
contention is  that even if this  best-candidate theory can productively be analyzed in different terms, that 
outcome recommends  further open-minded investigation of theory-structures, both in ecology and across  a 
range of  flourishing but lawless disciplines.
Specifically, Weber’s  (1999) interest is ecology’s  Competitive Exclusion Principle (CEP). He argues  that 
while not a necessary, universal generalization, the CEP can be interpreted as  a causal regularity of the sort 
defined by Waters (1998). Though the CEP faces  exceptions, Weber argues for its  lawfulness  by drawing on 
ecologist David Tilman’s (1982) resource-competition theory, contending that Tilman’s  theory contextualizes 
the CEP and so identifies and explains cases  where the CEP does  not hold. Weber suggests  that though the 
CEP faces  exceptions, a class  of them is  filled in by Tilman’s  theory, and that even if further exceptions 
remain to be filled in, this  produces  a template for ecological progress  in which the inaccuracies of central, 
explanatory laws are plugged up by wads  of ancillary regularities. I argue to the contrary that the 
understanding in Tilman’s theory—even if it is  feasible to reconstruct it as  lawful—is  better understood as 
explaining through an approach I call “channeling explanation.” That is, the body of theory Weber uses 
from Tilman has  a further context. It is  explained by Tilman in a way that relegates  regularities  to the 
background.
2. Responses to Lawlessness 
Before philosophy of ecology emerged, a key turn in philosophy of biology’s  adolescence of the early 
1980s  came with philosophers (e.g.,  Beatty  1981) resolving that if evolutionary biology fails  to resemble 
existing frameworks for explanatory theory, so much the worse for those frameworks. Evolutionary biology 
and genetics, it was  recognized, offer such robust explanatory theory that if they do not fit neatly into 
philosophical accounts of theory-structure and explanation, philosophy of science should investigate how 
they represent and explain rather than treating them as  “immature” (in the sense of Nagel 1961). Then, with 
biological cases newly sanctioned as  starting points  for understanding adult science, debate over alternative 
frameworks for making sense of  them spurred philosophy of  biology’s growth.
Now, philosophy of ecology faces  puberty. The direction of its  maturation turns  on whether ecology is 
both sufficiently robust and sufficiently different to motivate modifying or extending philosophy of science. 
Otherwise, ecology will remain a domain for applying philosophy of science. An entirely applied philosophy 
of ecology could be worthwhile, but would lead a cloistered existence, while the philosophies  of physics, 
evolutionary biology, and psychology have thrived by not similarly confining themselves. If philosophy of 
ecology can develop along these lines, its  challenge becomes offering something back to philosophy of 
science.
Unfortunately, there are reasons  to treat ecology as immature in Nagel’s  (1961) sense, even doomed to 
protracted adolescence. Its  theory, nearly all less  than a century old, confronts  a heterogeneous  domain with 
an unsettled ontology, diverse and obscure causal interactions, and few clearly-bounded systems or processes. 
These difficulties  suggest broad and narrow pessimisms. A broad pessimism places ecology within a range of 
disciplines unable to produce laws because of the complexity of their domains. Cooper (2003) observes  that 
“the theoretical tradition in ecology has  been driven by the goal of finding simple quantitative laws, the kind 
of laws  that would put ecology on all fours  with the more secure sciences” (133). However, causal complexity 
might create exceptions  for any potential laws, making them either false or in need of being qualified as 
ceteris paribus, or “all else being equal.” If ceteris paribus-qualification can render statements  vacuous, in so far 
as  any general statement with at least one confirming instance may be true when so qualified, ceteris paribus-
qualified generalizations  should not be treated as  substantive truths. Without laws, ecology remains a stunted 
imitation of physics. Earman and Roberts (1999), for example, recognizing the exceptions  riddling the 
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generalizations  of most sciences, argue against the many attempts  to understand them as  substantive, but 
ceteris paribus-qualified, laws. In their estimation, non-physical sciences  now require not philosophers’ efforts 
to figure out how to render their laws substantial by analyzing ceteris paribus clauses, but rather better science. 
Better science might yield laws  or near-laws  like they conclude relativity theory has. If ecology’s  domain 
resists  laws, ecologists  should work harder. Alternately, a more focused pessimism targets  ecology’s  special 
difficulties  with identifying laws. Shrader-Frechette and McCoy (1993) and Peters (1991) think it misguided 
for ecology to seek explanatory laws, and instead sketch out successful ecological theory as  merely particular
—as  a matter for case studies  and local understandings  rather than general theory. Sarkar (1996), too, argues 
that given an immediate need for ecological guidance in the face of conservation crises, case studies  offer 
more value than general principles.
Less  pessimistic responses  from philosophers  to the gap between current ecology and the Newtonian 
Ideal have generally taken one of two forms  suggested above: relaxing philosophical definitions  of “law,” or 
making sense of ecological theory’s  relationship to the world without them. Cooper writes, “if our concept 
of law prevents  us  from recognizing laws  in ecology, that does  not mean that ecology is  destined to become a 
science of case studies … It means  that we need a new concept of law” and, more generally, a “better, more 
realistic image of successful science” (2003, 113). Philosopher Marc Lange  (2002) argues  that ecology’s 
Species-Area relationship can count as  a law, but only at the cost of defining laws  as  reliable inference rules 
rather than necessary, universal generalizations without other features  philosophers  have required for laws 
like supporting counterfactuals  (i.e., “had the cause not obtained, the effect would not have either”). A 
number of ecologists  have taken this  approach, too, like Lawton  (1999), Poulin  (2007), and Dodds  (2009). 
They eagerly identify laws, but at the cost of accepting rough, local generalizations  as  “laws.” This  approach 
elevates  ecology even more if one is  willing to argue that even the generalizations  of physics  have achieved 
only some similar, weaker status.
Another optimistic strategy is  to treat theoretical claims—whether they have the form of laws  or not—as 
having a different relationship to the world. For example, having been a popular alternative for making sense 
of evolutionary biology amid doubts  about its  laws  (Lloyd 1988; Thompson 1988), the Semantic View of 
theories  has  been transposed to ecology (Castle  2001). (Not all versions  of the Semantic View address 
themselves to the problem of exceptions  to laws, but Suppe  [2000] and Beatty  [1981] are explicitly 
motivated by it.) The Semantic View is  a set of variations on the idea that scientific theories  are families of 
models. Some versions of the Semantic View hold that models  do not make claims  about the world directly. 
However, the Semantic View does  not on its  own illuminate how or why some models explain better than 
others. Alternatively, Cooper (2003) has  recommended understanding ecological claims as  justified by claims 
about capacities, as  on Cartwright’s  (1989) model. In that case, the explanatory power of theoretical claims 
in ecology would derive from their relationships  to the capacities  or powers  its  individuals have (e.g., 
swallows can eat a hundred flies  an hour). However, empiricists, believing that only what is  observable 
belongs  in science, have long doubted whether capacities are observable, and suggested that unobservable 
properties cannot ground explanations. Yet, if one can overcome such doubts, this  approach makes  up for a 
lack of invariant generalizations. Even so, generating explanations from capacities  requires  knowledge 
ecologists  rarely have, especially if the aim is  to build up to general theory from individual organisms’ 
capacities. Cartwright (2002) comments,
We know for the powers  of physics  when they will be exercised (e.g., a massive object always attracts 
other masses); and …we have rules for how to calculate what happens  when different capacities  operate 
together (e.g., the vector addition law for forces). This  kind of knowledge is  missing for many other 
subjects. That is why they cannot make exact predictions” (429). 
Such missing knowledge challenges  hanging ecological explanation and prediction on the capacities  of its 
individuals.
Thus, a variety of options  are available for making sense of ecology’s  scientific strength. What standard 
should we use to decide among them? I suggest that the appropriate philosophical account of ecology is  the 
one that best captures  its  predictive and/or explanatory successes. Though it may be possible to unify 
ecology’s  diverse bodies of theory (as Roughgarden  [2009] and Vellend and Agrawal  [2010] suggest), 
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different philosophical accounts  may be necessary for different parts  of ecology. If an imitation of physics’s 
strict laws  is  the best ecology can be understood as  achieving, then that is  how we should understand it. But 
let us see. 
3. The Competitive Exclusion Principle as Causal Regularity 
Like Colyvan and Ginzburg (2003) and Ginzburg and Colyvan (2004), Weber (1999) argues  that ecology 
has  laws—if not necessary, universal ones, then something close enough. Specifically, he believes  that the 
Competitive Exclusion Principle (CEP) serves  as  a law that grounds  explanations  of community dynamics. 
Not only does  he conclude that the CEP serves  as  a law, but also that it stands  up to Beatty’s  (1995) 
evolutionary contingency objection that there are no genuine biological laws  because biology’s law-
candidates  are either contingent or not distinctively biological. (They would not be distinctively biological if 
made true by chemistry or physics.) Weber’s  strategy is  to demonstrate that while the CEP has  exceptions, 
the exceptions  are produced by identifiable circumstances  ecologists  understand. Therefore, it need not be 
qualified with a potentially vacuous ceteris paribus clause.
Loosely expressed, the CEP claims that populations of different species  cannot coexist for long on the 
same resources. Confusingly, it has  been rendered more precise in different ways, reflecting its multiple 
origins. Udvardy  (1959) traces its  explicit statement back to Joseph Grinnell (Grinnell 1904, 372), though 
Hardin (1960) notes  the earlier passage from On the Origin of Species in which Darwin anticipates  the CEP by 
asserting that struggles  for resources  lead inevitably to extinctions of some competitors. The principle itself 
has  taken various  forms  as it is used to analyze community dynamics. Hardin, for instance, treats  the CEP as 
describing a phenomenon arising from species’ differences. For him, it asserts  that minute differences 
between competing species  with respect to their efficiency in converting resources  into offspring are sufficient 
to produce the local extinction of one of them, ceteris paribus (Hardin 1960, 1293). Other expressions  of the 
principle emphasize similarities between species  as producers  of extinctions. Weber employs such a version 
derived from G. Evelyn Hutchinson, who uses  the CEP to analyze the mystery of plankton coexisting on 
shared resources  in a homogeneous  marine environment. Following this  classic analysis, Weber renders  the 
CEP as  expressing that “species  with insufficiently differentiated fundamental niches  cannot coexist at 
equilibrium” (76). Hutchinson’s  “fundamental niche” concept refers  to a region in an abstract, 
multidimensional state-space defining the circumstances a species  is  specialized to live in, where each 
dimension represents  a habitat feature. For him, the CEP suggests  that ecological similarities  among species, 
described as significantly-overlapping fundamental niches, produce exclusion (Hutchinson 1957; 1961). (For 
the CEP’s history, see Kingsland [1995]).
Weber uses  the CEP with Tilman’s  elaboration to argue that ecology has  at least this  law-like regularity. 
More generally, for Weber identifying this  law reveals  that “law-like statements  play an important role in 
scientific theories  of this  kind,” and in the explanations  they offer (71). And further, even if Weber intends 
his  title mainly as  allusion to Duhem and not as  an assertion of comprehensiveness, identifying the law 
should illuminate “The Aim and Structure of Ecological Theory.” While Weber does  not explicitly couch his 
agenda in terms of the status  of ecology, that ecology has  realized its  aim of building theory around laws 
serves  to elevate evolutionary biology, against which he invokes  a contrast in his  first sentences: “Why should 
evolution be lawful, and ecological processes  not?” (71). The CEP is  a candidate, and against this standard 
Weber suggests, “ecology knows evolutionarily invariant generalizations  which are law-like and at the same 
time distinctively biological” (91).
To characterize its  lawfulness, Weber recommends the CEP as an instance of a “causal regularity” of 
the sort described by Waters  (1998), who uses the concept to refer to the specific kind of stable, non-
contingent regularities  he suggests  widely undergird biological explanations. In the critique of biological 
laws  Weber aims to resist, Beatty (1995) argues  that since biological kinds  are contingent because they 
evolved, any laws  covering them will be contingent as  well. Waters  claims that though generalizations 
concerning the distribution of biological kinds hold, if at all, contingently—perhaps unlike those concerning 
physical kinds—much explanatory knowledge in biology can be rendered as non-contingent generalizations. 
These generalizations are causal regularities  like (his  example) that blood vessels  containing sufficient elastin 
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expand when internal pressure increases. The advantage causal regularities  have over necessary laws  as 
frameworks for understanding biology is  that they are necessarily true of certain entities, despite their range 
of application being contingent. Waters suggests  that a separate class  of generalizations expresses  the 
contingent distributions  of biological kinds. And so, the truth of causal regularities  is  not undermined by 
evolutionary contingency.
A problem with treating the CEP as a causal regularity in Waters’s  sense arises  because causal 
regularities  “pick out a theoretical kind marked by a uniform internal make-up that causes  its  tokens  to 
behave in uniform ways” (24). Physiological similarities  among related organisms—mammalian eyes dilate 
when ambient light decreases  and do so because of their common structure—comprise one class  of 
examples. However, ecological niche overlap and differentiation are not usually entirely functions  of 
“internal make-up” or physiology. Organisms  with very different physiologies  sometimes  have significantly-
overlapping niches  (and limiting-resource requirements), like nightjars  and insectivorous  bats. Organisms 
with very similar physiologies  frequently have different niches  because of habitat differences. Consequently, 
the CEP conforms  better to the third kind of generalization in Waters’s  classificatory scheme. It better 
resembles  a “functional generalization,” a rule applying to “behavior exhibited by entities with quite 
different internal make-ups” (24–25). Functional generalizations  ride on top of sets  of causal regularities, 
bringing the phenomena they describe under a single description, despite a lack of internal uniformity. 
Waters’s  example comes  from classical genetics: “whenever allele a is  dominant to allele b, organisms with 
the ab genotype will exhibit the trait associated with the a  allele” (24). In this case, dominance is  a functional 
concept, not a feature of  common internal make-up.
However, in Waters’s  scheme functional generalizations  are true by definition. They need to be, to block 
contingency. Causal regularities  resist contingency because they cite common structures  as  necessitating 
effects, and functional generalizations  do not assert such necessitation. Though Weber should thus  treat the 
CEP as  a functional generalization, there are compelling reasons  not to treat it as  a tautology—as  true by 
definition—even if it sometimes has been. Though one early formulator of the CEP, Georgii Gause, 
believed the principle empirically falsifiable, later ecologists  endorsed its  logical truth. Garrett Hardin, 
especially, in an article with the CEP as  its  title declares  that “the ‘truth’ of the principle is  and can be 
established only by theory, not being subject to proof or disproof by facts, as  ordinarily understood” (1960, 
1293). His  central premise is  that the principle would be very difficult to prove or disprove empirically, 
because a fundamental niche is  an abstract property of a group of organisms, and extremely difficult to 
characterize precisely (even if it were rigid—something evolution, niche construction, variation within and 
among populations, and developmental plasticity each offer reasons  to doubt). That is, the co-existence of 
any two competing populations  may count as  a departure from the CEP, but may also result from their 
occupying slightly different niches. Along these lines, Begon et al. (1990) note the “very real methodological 
problem in positively establishing the pertinence of the competitive exclusion principle in any particular 
situation,” because where competition is  observed, “it is  often difficult to establish positively that there is 
niche differentiation, and it is  impossible to prove the absence of it” (252). However, methodological 
challenges and conceptual imprecision per se do not a tautology make. Stronger reasons  for the CEP’s  logical 
truth are its  derivability from theory, specifically from one version of the Lotka-Volterra competition 
equations  (Gotelli 2008), and the possibility that competitive exclusion is  entailed by the very concepts  of 
“fundamental niches” and their “sufficient differentiation.” In this  latter case, any niche as  such would need 
to be distinct from others, and significant overlap among niches  would entail competition to the point of 
exclusion simply because exclusive occupation defines  a prerequisite for lasting survival. Contra Gause, these 
considerations support its logical truth.
However, semantics  in this  case can usefully follow practice, and the CEP has  repeatedly been subjected 
to testing, and so employed empirically. Ecologists’ repeated testing entails  that “niche” is  being used in a 
way that is  consistent with the possibility of permanent overlap. Thomas Park’s (1948) experiments  on flour 
beetles  are early examples  of this  body of work, and I mention two other examples  below. Such testing 
suggests  that ecologists  have not always  treated the CEP as  true by definition, and in that case, not only can 
it not be a causal regularity (because it faces  exceptions), it cannot be a functional generalization either 
(because it is not a logical truth). 
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4. Exceptions to the CEP: Leaks, Stoppers, and Leaky Stoppers  
Ultimately, to serve explanation as  a causal regularity (sensu Waters  1998), Weber needs  the CEP to at 
least be true. Yet, it is  riddled with known exceptions. That is, there is  not a version of it we know to be true. 
Two exceptional cases Weber acknowledges  are where a predator on two competing species  suppresses  their 
numbers  such that they never become sufficiently abundant to compete for resources, and where “the 
competition process  is periodically interrupted, e.g. by population reductions, [such that] competitive 
exclusion may not proceed to completion” (77). Other exceptions  include cases where resources  are not 
limiting and where density-dependence is  nonlinear (Gotelli 2008, 114–115), and where the competitors are 
two functionally-identical species, physiologically and morphologically similar enough to have identical 
ecological footprints, despite distinct evolutionary lineages. In light of such exceptions, the CEP begins  to 
resemble less a causal regularity than a ceteris paribus generalization.
Acknowledging this, Weber insists  the CEP’s  exceptions  do not threaten its  lawfulness. He finds 
Hutchinson suggesting that the CEP “is  true except in cases  where there are good reasons  not to expect it to 
be true,” and he interprets  this  to mean that the conditions  defeating the CEP can be specified antecedently 
(Hutchinson  1957, 419). Helpfully, a list of known exceptions  would not force a generalization into a 
dilemma between falsehood and vacuous ceteris paribus  qualification, because the list of exceptions itself 
(rather than a ceteris paribus-clause) could be appended to the CEP. Considering a few examples of ecologists 
predicting exceptions to the CEP on the basis of theory, Weber remarks  optimistically that “ecologists  have 
been quite successful in spelling out conditions that restrict the principle’s  domain of application” (78). But 
(as  one of Weber’s reviewers  also pointed out) that we anticipate in advance some exceptions  or domain 
restrictions is  beside the point; if we are interested in lawfulness  in Waters’s  sense, we want to know whether 
all the limitations on the CEP can be specified in advance. Otherwise it is  a classically problematic ceteris 
paribus generalization.
Acknowledging that not all exceptions  are known, Weber recommends  that knowledge shy of full 
understanding is  adequate: “while a complete list of such mechanisms  [producing exceptions] may not be 
available at present, theory provides  an abstract scheme for all these mechanisms.” Like Marc Lange’s (1993) 
solution to the ceteris paribus problem, Weber’s  supposes  that ecologists  have a “theoretical understanding” of 
conditions  producing exceptions, here in the form of “abstract mechanism.” More than this  is  required, 
Weber reasons, only if one is  committed to deductivism about explanation—to the view that what is 
explained can be logically derived from explaining statements. Yet, ceding deduction as  a scientific goal, we 
thereby cede the core motivation for finding ecological theory that can be mapped on to the Newtonian 
Ideal. Possessing laws  confers status  on a discipline mainly because laws  offer deductive rigor. If the point of 
identifying a body of research within it that includes  laws  is  to recognize ecology’s  status  as  a mature 
discipline, then abandoning the feature conferring that status  undercuts  the project’s  motivation. Or it does 
so unless  imperfect laws  supplemented with something like “abstract scheme” are as good as  laws, or they 
are not as good but are the best ecology can do. The question becomes whether one of  these is so.
The only way to assess this  question is  to observe whether ecologists  in practice treat the CEP (assisted 
by their tacit understanding) as true across  a known range of applications. Despite Hutchinson’s  optimism, 
that ecologists  actively test particular systems for conformity to the CEP tells  against the field having such 
tacit knowledge. As early as  Park, ecologists  have expressed ignorance about why and when apparent 
competitive exclusions occur. In Park’s  two-species competition experiments, one species  reliably collapsed, 
but time to extinction varied from 180 to 1470 days, which species  disappeared was  unpredictable, and Park 
could not explain why one or the other had gone extinct even retrospectively. More recently, 
Silvertown  (1983) determined that “competitive exclusion and niche separation are not important 
phenomena” in limestone pavement habitat because plants  coexist there, but for unknown reasons, perhaps 
because of regular disturbances  but perhaps not. Kullberg  (1982) found that in algal communities the 
expectations  of the CEP are not met, but for unknown reasons: “this  is  paradoxical in accordance with the 
concepts  of the competitive exclusion principle. Uniformity should not lead to diversity and yet, under this 
most uniform of natural environments, diversity is  maintained during the seral stages, and hierarchical order 
is  sustained” (242). That is, the persistence of research programs  testing the CEP and the inability to specify 
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the causes  of exceptions  tells  against ecologists  having a tacit understanding of the causes  of the full range of 
exceptions to the CEP.
Yet, as  I mentioned, Weber also makes a case for one particular abstract mechanism that fills  in a major 
exception to the CEP. Treating the CEP as  a “source law,” in Elliott Sober’s  (1984) sense—as  describing a 
default state against which disturbing forces  act—Weber offers  that the CEP “suggests a ‘default’ scenario 
which raises  the question of why so many plant species  can generally subsist on a small number of limiting 
resources. Theory then postulates  a mechanism, in Tilman’s  case an interaction of resource competition and 
environmental heterogeneity, which explains  how species  can evade competitive displacement” (85). So, in 
Weber’s  construal, Tilman identifies an exception to the CEP, then explains  that exception by appealing to a 
mechanism explaining it, thus  patching an important hole in the CEP. The exception is  a case where species 
with overlapping niches  coexist at equilibrium due to different capacities for resource-exploitation. The 
mechanism is a feature of a more general model of resource competition, accounts  of which appear in 
Tilman (1980, 1982) and many ecology textbooks. Tilman’s  resource-competition model can be thought of 
as  formalizing the idea that competitions  for resources can be won by organisms  able to get by on the 
smallest amount of essential limiting resources. If one population can make do with less  than others, it can 
survive when they do not. Tilman designates the level of a resource a population can get by on is  its  “R*,” 
and so the model is sometimes called the R* model.
The R*  model predicts a variety of specific cases  where coexistence is  possible for two (or more) 
populations  with overlapping resource-requirements and competing for limiting resources. In one case, two 
populations  competing for a single resource can coexist when they have equal R* values. R*  is  the level of 
resource availability at which a population’s resource-dependent growth balances  its  mortality, so that it 
neither increases or decreases, and is in this  sense at equilibrium (Tilman 1982, 44–49). That is, with more 
resources  the population would increase, and with fewer it would decrease. If competition reduces  a 
resource’s  availability to the R* value for one of the populations, then that population stops  increasing, by 
definition, because its  R* is  the point at which it can no longer convert the resource into the production of 
enough new individuals  to balance the mortality it faces. The model predicts  that if species  differ in their 
R* values, the availability of the resource will be depleted to the R* value of one of them. At this  point, that 
population can no longer increase, while any species  with lower R*  values  will continue to. Under such 
circumstances  the model predicts  the population with the lowest R* will competitively displace others, since 
it will be able to continue to increase after the others  can no longer. However, in the long term, it predicts 
coexistence of two species when the two populations  have equivalent R*  values, and this offers  the 
theoretical basis for the CEP-exception of  interest to Weber.
The present question is  whether this  prediction faces  any exceptions. Frustratingly, it faces  many. Will 
two populations  coexist if they have equal R*  values? Not necessarily, if they face disease, predators, oil 
spills, or any of myriad other possible disturbing conditions. Can they coexist? Sure, the populations can 
coexist if nothing untoward interferes. However, that is  not what is  needed if the ambition is  to defend the 
CEP as  a strict law or causal regularity, as Weber tries  to do. What is  needed in that case is  for the appended 
mechanism to be able to define the exceptional circumstances. Tilman’s  model does  not. Just as plugs  in 
dams  must be impermeable to serve as  “plugs,” however, if this  theoretical structure is  to escape the 
problems  motivating Weber’s  discussion of it, the mechanisms  explaining exceptions  should not themselves 
be subject to exceptions. By no means does  this  make the model useless, nor does it entail that there is  no 
way to satisfyingly capture the model’s  explanatory resources in terms  of generalizations. Nor does  it 
recommend that the sequence of asserting a generalization, finding exceptions, stopping them up, finding 
exceptions  in the stopper, stopping them up, and so on, is  not a productive methodology for ecology. Rather, 
it suggests that if Weber has chosen the best case he can find for defending ecology’s  attainment of laws  (the 
CEP with Tilman’s  amendment), and has  chosen the best weakening of strict laws  he can find (Waters’s 
causal regularities), and many exceptions remain, it might be productive to examine the theory for 
explanatory structures  other than laws. In fact, optimism about ecological explanation finds  a basis  in this 
body of research, I will argue, but it is  a richer and uglier basis  than Weber’s  brand of optimism 
recommends. 
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5. Contextualizing Resource Competition 
Given its susceptibility to disturbing conditions, Tilman’s  resource-competition theory just described 
may best be understood as  a model, or as  standing in some other relationship to natural systems where it is 
not expected to provide exceptionless, true claims. As  a model it would suggest what long-term outcomes  of 
competition would be expected under idealized conditions  that were possible, if at all, only in controlled 
laboratory conditions. This is  Bob O’Hara’s  (2005) conclusion, for instance, after rejecting Weber’s 
argument for reasons  similar to mine. O’Hara is  optimistic about ecological generalizations, just so long as 
they not be called laws, as  “calling them laws  is  to give them an epistemological status  they don’t 
deserve” (393). Other ecologists  will consider this  debate merely semantic, even “philosophical” in a 
pejorative sense. Even if approximating the Newtonian Ideal were the structure of all ecological 
understanding, philosophy of science would still have strategies  for model improvement and standards  for 
model success to comment on. But Weber’s  case is  interesting because it suggests  a structure that differs  in 
more than what it is  called. In Tilman’s  broader theory, the resource-competition model Weber analyzes is 
subsumed by a more general, causal theory which has the virtue of  being free of  exceptions.
As described above, a central variable in Tilman’s resource-competition model is  the reproductive or 
growth response of populations  to resources. Yet in Tilman’s  body of theory, this parameter is  not basic, in 
so far as  it is  explained by other properties. A species’ ability to grow or reproduce in response to increased 
availability of certain resources  is  a function of its  particular morphology and physiology—its  shape and its 
functional adaptations  to particular habitats. Plants  vary wildly with respect to the proportion of nutrients, 
energy, and biomass  they devote to each part of their anatomies, and thus  to each of their functions. Slow-
growing woody plants, for instance, devote only 1%–6%  of their biomass  to leaves; tall perennial trees 
extending into forest canopy may have the vast majority of their biomass  in their trunks, and less  than 1% of 
it in leaves. In contrast, annual plants  devote 50%–70% of their biomass to leaves; soil-dwelling algae 
approach allocations  of 100% of biomass  to their photosynthetic structures, to what are functionally their 
leaves  (Tilman 1988, 58–60). If the primary function of leaves  is  photosynthesis, and therefore generating 
energy for rapid growth, this  discrepancy appears not to be accidental. Allocations  of biomass  to leaves serve 
fast-growing plants and improve their ability to compete in the habitats they specialize in.
Accordingly, each kind of plant’s capacity for converting resources  into reproduction is  a function of 
when and how it devotes  resources and biomass  to reproductive structures  like seeds. Morphological 
resource allocation largely determines  the ability to compete for light and soil nutrients, and this  determines 
properties like its  R*, because a “plant with a morphology that allows  it to be a superior competitor at one 
nutrient supply rate is  necessarily an inferior competitor at higher and lower supply rates  compared to plants 
with other morphologies” (Tilman 1988, 111). From this  expectation that differential success  will be due to 
morphology and physiology, ecologists  can produce explanations  for why species  will grow in some rather 
than other circumstances. However, no single factor is predictive:
Neither photosynthetic efficiency nor allocation to roots  nor any other single physiological or 
morphological trait of plants  can predict, by itself, what should happen when two or more size-
structured plant species  compete. The ability of a plant to grow and compete in a habitat with a 
particular resource supply rate and a particular loss  rate is  determined by interactions among numerous 
physiological, morphological, and life history traits (Tilman 1988, 94–95).
Yet these factors can be understood in a more general framework as  consequences  of the allocation trade-
offs  forced by absolute and contextual constraints. While a typical way to incorporate numerous traits  and 
interactions  into a model would be to make them variables  in an elaborate equation, Tilman treats  them 
instead as dimensions  of a state-space. The space has  as its  dimensions  variables along which plants  face 
constraints on growth and reproduction.
Limited nutrients  and energy force on plants  an allocation “decision” at both evolutionary and 
individual scales. Plants  need to allocate resources  to “photosynthetic tissues, structural and nutrient 
transport tissues, nutrient absorptive tissues, and reproductive tissues,” which roughly correspond in vascular 
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plants  to “leaves, stems, roots, and seeds” (54). Were a plant to allocate all the resources  available for new 
growth to new photosynthetic tissues, it could achieve the maximal growth possible under its light conditions 
(which are a resource constraint). In photosynthesis, chlorophyll, carotenoids, phycobilins  and other 
pigments capture solar energy and retain it in ATP, which provides  energy for everyday physiology as  well as 
synthesis  of new tissue. Since photosynthesis  is  the primary source of ATP, allocation to photosynthetic 
tissue maximizes  developmental potential. But to the degree that a plant grows  photosynthetic tissues—often 
leaves—it is  to that degree not enhancing its  ability to do other things, like collect soil nutrients  or increase 
its  height enough that it can maintain full exposure to light. So when a plant competes  with other species, 
allocation of resources  to anything but photosynthetic structures  constrains growth; but failure to allocate to 
other structures  constrains accumulation of needed resources. These constraints thus  entail a trade-off, and 
how a species  or individual plant specializes  itself in response to this  forced trade-off determines, or has its 
expression in, the details of  its anatomy and physiology.
Plants  face other constraints  besides resource limitations. Plants face basic physical constraints, too, 
limiting possible solutions  to trade-offs. Imagine a plant devoting nearly all its  growth to its  stem and only a 
small proportion to its  leaves  and almost none at all to roots. Rootless, it would quickly collapse. So, gravity, 
set in relation to hypothetical masses  of potential plants  and even wind velocities, imposes  a constraint on 
which morphologies  can survive and compete in certain circumstances. Physiologically, rather than 
morphologically, plants face other constraints  in that for instance a plant without adequate transport 
structures  in its  stem would be unable to pass soil nutrients, water, and matter from its  roots to its  leaves. Also 
in the physiological realm, plants  require enzymes  for most of their activities, and thus face a trade-off in 
producing more of some of these than others. So, a plant’s  absolute physiological requirements  will impose 
limits  on its  potential form. But also, the acquisition of a particular form entails  relative physiological 
requirements, too. Such constraints then carry the implication that a certain subset of potential 
morphologies  which might in their absence be expected to survive and compete under some particular 
circumstances  will because of them not succeed. The constraints  thus  impose limits  in possibility space over 
the sorts  of organisms  able to survive, under varying soil conditions, wind velocities, humidities, 
temperatures, and the like (Tilman 1988, 120–123).
Consequently, all the organismal properties  determining outcomes in Tilman’s  R* model can be causally 
explained by the trade-offs  all organisms face and each species’ solutions  to those trade-offs. An organism’s 
ability to convert a particular resource to reproduction and the minimum resource level at which it can do so 
(R*) are obviously functions of its  morphology and physiology. But given that simple idea, constraints  and 
trade-offs  provide common, quantifiable terms  for comparing species’ abilities  to survive and compete for 
resources. Together, these constraints  and trade-offs, their solutions, and the quantified capacities  (like R*) 
yielded by these solutions  explain why what happens  in the idealized circumstances  of the resource-
competition model happens  there. In this  way, the R* model is subsumed by the constraints  and trade-offs 
framework. In the next section, I characterize this framework.
6. Channeling Explanations  
Nature rarely offers such idealized circumstances  in which these more basic features  support the 
outcomes of the R* model, so explaining the idealized case alone is  not yet novel. The explanatory novelty 
appears  when we pay attention to how a constraints  and trade-offs  framework can handle disturbance. 
Constraints  and trade-offs  become components  of vegetation explanations  by blocking out regions  of multi-
dimensional state-space. As  in the abstract multi-dimensional spaces  used to describe niches, each dimension 
of the space represents  a circumstance relevant to organisms’ survival. Constraints and trade-offs  block out 
regions  of this  space as  uninhabitable for organisms  with certain characteristics. For example, above and 
below certain temperatures, hydration and solar radiation levels, no plant can survive. These absolute 
constraints  make regions  of state-space uninhabitable by any plant. Then, settling on certain solutions  to 
forced trade-offs  like resource-allocation makes  narrower regions  viable for plants  developing according to 
those solutions, and regions viable on their own become nonviable in various  combinations. Assembling 
nonviable regions then creates  channels of viability in state-space, regions  in which it is  possible for plants  to 
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survive. Thus, at the most general or abstract explanatory level, plants  or vegetation are explained by their 
viability. However, this explanatory structure handles different levels of  generality and specificity.
What is  explained by a constrained state-space like one which incorporates  only general, universal 
constraints  is  not the presence of individual plants, but widespread gradients. Planes within viable regions  of 
state-space can be represented as  a gradients  along which possible solutions  to trade-offs  share sets  of 
features. Tilman specifically identifies  two gradients  as  defining forms, functions, and life-histories  likely to 
succeed as  conditions  vary, a soil resource:light gradient (along which loss-rate is  held constant), and a loss-
rate gradient (along which the first gradient, resources:light, is  held constant). Recognizing even a small set 
of constraints  yields  “the prediction that all successions  should progress, at least initially, from short to tall 
species. Further, they predict that secondary successions should progress, initially, from rapidly growing 
species to more slowly growing species” (239). Gradients  are therefore widespread regularities. In state-space, 
they are simple surfaces  within regions  of state-space that are viable when universal constraints  and trade-
offs  are introduced. That is, they are explained by state-spaces  not making reference to particular natural 
systems.
Explaining the dynamics  of more particular systems  involves  incorporating further constraints—the 
constraints  at work in those systems—and sometimes adding new dimensions  for them to explanatory state-
space. As  circumstances  change over time, new regions  of state-space become absolutely uninhabitable, or 
uninhabitable by organisms with particular characteristics, and changes  in vegetation, as  in primary or 
secondary succession, can thus be explained by shifting constraints. Shifting constraints  force changes  in 
what characteristics  are viable and thus  changes  in vegetation, against a background of other, stable 
constraints. For example, at Cedar Creek Natural History Area (CCNHA) in Minnesota (now named ‘Cedar 
Creek Ecosystem Science Reserve’), where Tilman’s group has  established long-term experimental plots, a 
common successional sequence runs  from annuals  and short-lived perennials, to perennial grasses 
dominated by bluestem, followed by woody plants  including oak and white pine. A series of experiments  at 
CCNHA supported the hypothesis  that a trade-off between colonization capacity and nutrient-acquisition 
capacity controls the early, herbaceous  portion of succession there, while the later part of succession appears 
to be controlled by the trade-off between nutrient-acquisition capacity and light-acquisition capacity 
(Tilman  1990, 11–12). “Control” here means not that these factors  are individually responsible for 
successional dynamics, but rather that shifting constraints  have forced observed changes  in vegetation, given 
a certain set of  background constraints.
The explanatory strategy just illustrated exemplifies  what I label “channeling explanation.” An actual 
state of affairs  is  channel-explained when shown to remain possible in contrast with a range of other states 
of affairs which are shown impossible. States of affairs  are shown impossible as  a function of theory and/or 
information about an explanandum’s  circumstances  (where, following convention, an “explanandum” is  that 
which is  to be explained.) The “channeling” aspect of such explanations is  that, in a state-space, adding 
information about what is  impossible channels  states  of affairs into remaining regions  of viability. 
Constraints  on possibility may be absolute, circumstantial, or a combination of the two. Such explanations 
are especially useful when, as  with vegetation, regions  of viability are enclosed on more than side, especially 
in more than one dimension.
A concern about treating channeling explanations  as  explanatory is  that merely being represented as 
possible is  itself a very weak requirement for explanation. Accounts  of explanation have traditionally 
required demonstrating that explananda are made necessary by the explanatory framework, or at least 
probable, not merely actual, much less possible. For instance, insofar as  it does  not rule them out, Newtonian 
Mechanics  leaves  the existence of elephants  possible, but it does  not satisfyingly explain them. I would 
suggest, however, Newtonian Mechanics  does  add significant information to our understanding of why there 
are elephants; that having a metabolism is  physically possible is  a significant part of the explanation of why 
there are elephants. But it is not the whole explanation.
Even as  some channeling-explanations  will be unsatisfying, explananda can be channel-explained in 
degrees. The more alternative possibilities  one can rule out, the more information one has  about why 
something, rather than other things, is  the case. Even if it can never be shown that an explanandum must be 
the case, and there are always  other possibilities for what could occur in principle, adding circumstantial 
information can make an explanation converge on the explanandum. When little of state-space can be ruled 
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out, channeling explanations will be unsatisfying. But I noted that this  form of explanation can be employed 
for explananda with varying degrees  of specificity and abstraction—not only singular states but also general 
gradients on which it is easier to converge.
Here is  an example of explaining a singular state, perhaps  the hardest case for channeling explanation
—a mature pin oak in a certain woods. Vascular plants  like pin oak can survive only in certain ranges  of 
temperature, pH, hydration, and so forth. Like river banks, the circumstances  in an area limit viability to 
only those organisms  viable within those limits. Historical ranges in that woods  must have been such that it is 
physiologically possible for a pin oak to germinate and prosper. That does not entail that the oak be there. 
Nor does  it rule out the alternative that a “schmoak”—a hypothetical alien life-form with physiology 
identical to a pin oak’s—appears  instead. However, if possible vegetation is  further constrained by the 
contingent history of evolution of plants  on Earth, and then further constrained by contingent facts  of local 
biogeography like the availability of oak seeds, an oak becomes one of fewer and fewer possibilities. In this 
context, information about the presence of local resource-competitors  like elms  and facts  like their R* values 
can contribute to explaining the oak, too. If the biological world is  as  tightly packed with competitors as 
Darwin envisioned in his image of the barrel full of wedges, maximum information about such 
circumstances can eliminate all but quite specific possibilities.
Not only hypothetical organisms  like “schmoaks” remain possible in such state-spaces; real alternatives 
are possible, too. In one of Tilman’s  (1983) experimental studies, his  group established 36 experimental 
plots, denuded of vegetation on an old field at CCNHA and fertilized each of the plots  with a different 
nitrogen:magnesium ratio. Their goal was  to assess  how vegetation establishment would be affected by 
limiting-resource levels. However, the following year pocket gophers  invaded the experimental plots. In the 
end, though biomass and species-composition varied along the nitrogen:magnesium gradient, gopher 
mounds  were dominated by different species  than the other plots. Interestingly, gophers  preferentially built 
mounds  on nitrogen-treated plots, so that their effects  were correlated with nitrogen treatment. In this 
example, resource-competition theory alone neither predicts  nor explains the gopher-associated dominance 
of Setaria glauca (Yellow Foxtail) and Polygonum convovulus (Bindweed) over the Agrostis scabra (Rough Bentgrass) 
and Agropyron repens (Quackgrass), which dominated gopher-free high-nitrogen plots. By the same token, it 
does  not predict or explain the presence of the latter species, either, as  competition theory itself does  not 
account for gophers, much less  highway planning commissions. It does, however, rule out the establishment 
of shade-only ferns. Supplemented with further information about available migrants  and habitat 
conditions, it can say which of these migrants  can avoid competitive exclusion by others, explaining their 
presence that way, as  long-term viable where the others  are not. It offers  causal understanding about the 
presence of Foxtail and Bindweed, and the absence of shade-ferns, while not entailing that those species 
must or must not be present.
7. Channeling as Explanatory  
Channeling explanation thus  offers  a way of fitting facts  into the causal structure of the world. However, 
it differs  from Wesley Salmon’s  (1984;  1989) “ontic conception of explanation,” which this  language 
otherwise suggests, in that it does  not suppose the nomological necessity or even probability of its 
explanandum. On Salmon’s  ontic conception, “to explain an event is  to exhibit it as  occupying its 
(nomologically necessary) place in the discernible patterns  of the world.” Channeling explanation provides  a 
way of positioning facts  in relation to causes  in the absence of a complete causal story, and in the absence of 
nomological necessity (where causal laws  would undergird their effects  needing to happen). In suggesting 
that channeling explanation is  neither nomological or nomothetic (i.e., law-based) but also not probabilistic, 
I do not mean that laws  (or probabilities) are never involved. Some regions  of state-space eliminated as 
impossible for plant-growth may be eliminated by true, universal, counterfactual-supporting generalizations. 
The difference is  that except in cases  where the explanandum is  the entirety of viable possibility space, 
channeling explanation does not involve deductively deriving an explanandum from any law. It does  not assert 
that the explanandum has  to be. Being a mode of explanation rather than an account of what it means  to 
explain, channeling explanation can be useful in disciplines  or at levels  of description where explanatory 
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laws  and complete causal stories  are not forthcoming, and therefore deductive derivations  of explananda are 
unattainable.
That deductive derivation is  essential to explanation has  been widely held; Stathis  Psillos  (2002) 
comments  “the commitment to explanation as  a species  of deductive derivation has been so pervasive that it 
can hardly be exaggerated” (283). Descartes, Leibniz, and Mill all held this  view (Psillos  2007). More 
recently, “unificationist” accounts of explanation, like those of Friedman  (1974) and Kitcher  (1989) treat 
theories  as  explanatory when they reduce the number of brute facts in the world, by assimilating them into a 
single account, as  Newton made tides  and falling leaves—which beforehand had little to do with one another
—each effects  of gravitation. On such accounts, ideal explanations  are derivations  from such unifying 
theories  (Kitcher 1989, 430–432). “Pragmatic” accounts  of explanation like those of Achinstein (1984) and 
van Fraassen (1989) reject this  requirement, allowing, as  van Fraassen puts  it, that “scientific explanations  are 
simply, in my view, those which draw upon science for the adduced information” requested by a why-
question (186). However, channeling explanations meet a higher bar than the pragmatists  set in that they 
offer a way of presenting causal understanding, even when it is  not complete. Analogously, if a rubber duck 
placed in a river is  someplace on the river a few days  later, the position of the riverbanks  offer a good (if 
imprecise) explanation of its  location. Were the banks  impossible to breach (which is  to say, free of 
exceptions), the explanation would be even better.
Channeling explanation bears  similarities  to two other forms  of explanation recently discussed by 
philosophers, “how-possibly explanations” and “viability” or “design explanations.” Conceptually distinct 
but not conflicting, these other forms  of explanation can work together with channeling explanations in 
practice. Scientific how-possibly explanations have been described by Dray  (1957), Brandon  (1990), and 
Forber  (2010), especially to make sense of evolutionary explanations  such as  accounts  of adaptation. In 
contrast with what Dray calls  “how-actually explanations,” which provide accounts of how or why events 
actually do occur, how-possibly explanations  explain how they might possibly occur. Like channeling 
explanations, how-possibly explanations  establish a set of probabilities  or a region of possibility in state-
space and explain events  by positioning them in that space, sometimes  in contrast with other events which 
could not have occurred. Channeling explanations  work subtly but significantly differently, not offering a 
positive proof of an event’s  possibility but representing it as  not impossible given available information. 
Blocking out regions of possibility space as  impossible, like I have described, does  not entail asserting that 
remaining regions  are actually possible, as  they may well not be, given additional information. In fact, Forber 
notes that Brandon uses the apt example of a tropical plant growing in Switzerland. For Brandon, a how-
possibly explanation should “show how these plants  actually got to Switzerland as  well as  how it would be 
possible to cultivate plants  in Switzerland’s  climate” (Forber 2010, 36). Offering a channeling explanation 
does not require offering such a positive account or narrative.
Arno Wouters  has  recently described another explanatory structure based on constraints  in functional 
biology. He has called the explanations “viability explanations” (1995) and “design explanations” (2007). 
With some small differences, they are similar approaches  to explaining why organisms have some one trait 
rather than another. The earlier account of viability explanations focuses on what organisms  need, “fit[ting] 
a trait into a given organism and its  environment by showing why it is  needed in that organism and its 
environment” (1995, 437). Having identified a need, viability explanations  invoke a functional counterfactual 
of the form, “if condition B then (if trait A′ would not be in range S then organism i would have problem 
P),” where trait A′ being in the range S is  what an organism needs  to be viable” (1995, 443). Wouters’s  (2007) 
update, “design explanation,” focuses  more explicitly on the constraints  on what can be alive, which he calls 
“functional dependencies.” Like channeling explanations, these are built around contrasts  between actual 
states  of affairs—here, traits—explained by contrast with other hypothetical traits, which for design 
explanations  are those less  “useful” for an organism. “In many cases,” Wouters suggests, “the hypothetical 
organism” with some trait swapped out for a hypothetical alternative “cannot live,” and this  comes  close to 
channeling explanation (2007, 75). However, usefulness  is  a contrastive concept in design explanations. In 
them a trait can be explained by slightly increasing an organism’s ability to stay alive, such that design 
explanation presupposes  optimization (74). Channeling explanations  do not depend on explananda being 
better in any sense than other viable alternatives, nor on no other alternatives  being viable. A more 
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significant difference with channeling explanation lies in Wouters’s  insistence that viability and design 
explanations  are not causal, and explain only synchronically. That is, design explanations  do not have a 
historical dimension, and they do not assert that the constraints or “functional dependencies” they appeal to 
are causes. Stephen Jay Gould’s repeated usage of and gestures  towards  the explanatory value of constraints, 
especially as  they are can be expressed in “quantified morphospace,” is  similarly synchronic (Gould 1980). In 
contrast, channeling explanations  shine at handling dynamic systems, like the sequences  of changes 
collectively described as  plant succession. Plant succession can be explained by appealing to shifting 
constraints, which are thus  its  causes  (in the channeling sense described). Consequently, though they differ, it 
may be useful to group Wouters’s  forms  of design explanation with channeling explanations  as  species  of 
constraint-based explanation.
8. Assets of  Channeling  
I have argued that in the very case study Weber uses  to argue that ecology should be thought to have 
achieved laws, we find a structure of scientific understanding that is  not law-based. Moreover, it is  not 
merely a model, as  many other state-space theories  are. Unlike models, its  claims about what parts of state-
space are unrealizable are themselves direct claims about nature. It does  not depend on a further hypothesis 
on behalf of the model that it resembles  some part of nature. There is  a significant advantage in 
philosophically understanding Tilman’s  scientific reasoning this  way. It lies  in how potential exceptions  can 
be incorporated.
As I have characterized them, channeling explanations  can draw on a great deal of supplementary 
information about particular, local conditions. This  might raise a suspicion: if the R*  model were also 
allowed to be supplemented with such information, could its  exceptions  be accounted for? Not 
straightforwardly, I suggest. The obstacle for causal regularities  lies in incorporating disturbing conditions. 
For example, in the case of the gopher invasion at CCNHA, the R*  model alone would support the 
prediction that the plant with the lowest R* for nitrogen would dominate those plots. Then, supplemented 
with information about gophers, it could be supplemented with a further causal regularity of the form, 
“except that when gophers  invade, vegetation is  modified so.” Remember that the R*  model is  itself a 
stopgap for an exception. If we think about ecological understanding this  way, the structure of 
understanding becomes a potentially unending series of  clauses—exceptions to exceptions to exceptions.
Happily for ecology, researchers  in animal behavior, meteorology, and other disciplines analyzing 
phenomena affecting ecology’s  domain do have bodies  of rich causal understanding about such domains. A 
state-space representation of constraints  provides a structure for incorporating their theory as constraints  on 
vegetation. Compare this  way of incorporating further constraints  with incorporating further causal 
understanding into mathematical expressions  like the Lotka-Volterra competition equations. With such 
equations, additional theory can be incorporated only by adding terms  to the equations, making them 
increasingly intractable and raising the burden on data-collection to make values  come out correctly (even 
presuming all relevant terms can actually be incorporated). In contrast, the channeling explanation 
framework captures ecological theory’s  modularity—its  capacity to connect other bodies  of theory with its 
domain to produce understanding.
One might yet resist channeling-explanations  as  explanations, on the grounds  that they will always  be 
partial if they do not deductively entail their explananda. I have noted that the gap between channeling-
explanations  and deductive entailment can be quite large when only very general constraints  are invoked 
and the explanandum is  very particular. Such explanations  will be unsatisfying, as  it would be to explain the 
birth of Jumbo the elephant by pointing to it not being disallowed by classical thermodynamics. Yet, I have 
described how more specificity can be added to explanations by incorporating further relevant constraints, 
and this  possibility reveals  a further asset: it makes  sense of the very idea of a partial causal explanation in 
the absence of laws. Railton (1981) has  offered one of the best accounts  of what it means  to offer a partial 
explanation, suggesting that it involves offering information about an “ideal explanatory text” which stands 
behind the explanandum. Railton presumes  that the nodes  in the ideal explanation are connected by laws, but 
Woodward  (2003), responding to Railton, suggests  a range of cases  in which information about an ideal 
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explanatory text is  no explanation at all, and that includes  when relevant causal laws are known (175–181). 
Without causal laws, it is  very difficult to make sense of a partial causal explanation on a deductivist account 
of explanation. In a channeling framework however, it is  straightforward: every constraint is  causally related 
to explananda in its  state space, and a partial explanation is  one that cites some subset of those constraints. If 
this  makes  all channeling explanations  partial explanations, that simply reflects  that scientific disciplines 
operate at different levels  of description and that ecological explanations  can combine with those from other 
levels. Just to be able to understand how an ecological explanation might be both causal and partial is  a 
boon.
9. Conclusion  
The channeling framework represents  one way ecologists  have structured explanatory theory despite the 
wealth of exception-producing causal factors  in its  domain. For its  part, Weber’s  attempt to identify law-like 
regularities  in competition theory productively explores the limits  of the Newtonian ideal in contemporary 
ecology. Ecology would certainly derive considerable status from meeting that ideal, and it will be useful to 
continue searching for laws, like Dodds, Colyvan, and Ginzburg have. Yet, because of the explanatory power 
of laws, philosophers  of science have sometimes  approached the special sciences as  if with law-divining rods. 
When generalizations appear, philosophers  have worked to understand them as  laws, often by weakening 
“law” to include ceteris paribus  generalizations, generalizations  holding over a limited range of invariance, 
inference rules, non-universal causal regularities, and the like. My re-analysis  of Weber’s  case suggests that 
this  well-motivated habit can obscure non-nomological forms  of understanding and explanation. Just as  this 
branch of ecology appears  stronger described on its  own terms, philosophy of ecology is  likely to transcend 
its  adolescence by recognizing other ways in which ecologists  approach their domain that do not conform to 
the expectations of  the Newtonian Ideal.
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